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Abstract: With the aim of informing sound policy about data sharing and privacy, we describe 
successful re-identification of patients in an Australian de-identified open health dataset.  As in 
prior studies of similar datasets, a few mundane facts often suffice to isolate an individual.  
Some people can be identified by name based on publicly available information.  Decreasing 
the precision of the unit-record level data, or perturbing it statistically, makes re-identification 
gradually harder at a substantial cost to utility.  We also examine the value of related datasets 
in improving the accuracy and confidence of re-identification.  Our re-identifications were 
performed on a 10% sample dataset, but a related open Australian dataset allows us to infer 
with high confidence that some individuals in the sample have been correctly re-identified.  
Finally, we examine the combination of the open datasets with some commercial datasets that 
are known to exist but are not in our possession.  We show that they would further increase the 
ease of re-identification. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2016, pursuing the Australian government’s policy of open government data, the 
federal Department of Health published online the de-identified longitudinal medical billing 
records of 10% of Australians, about 2.9 million people.  For each selected patient, all publicly-
reimbursed medical and pharmaceutical bills for the years 1984 to 2014 were included.  
Suppliers' and patients' IDs were encrypted, though it was obvious which bills belonged to the 
same person. 
In September 2016 we decrypted IDs of suppliers (doctors, midwives etc) and informed the 
department.  The dataset was then taken offline. In this paper we show that patients can also 
be re-identified, without decryption, by linking the unencrypted parts of the record with known 
information about the individual.  Our aim is to inform policy about data sharing and privacy 
                                                     
1 All of the sensitive database queries were conducted by V Teague.  
with a scientific demonstration of the ease of re-identification of this kind of data.  We notified 
the Department of Health of these findings in December 2016.   
Access to high quality, and at times sensitive, data is a modern necessity for many areas of 
research. The challenge we face is in how to deliver that access, whilst still protecting the 
privacy of the individuals in the associated datasets. There is a misconception that this is either 
a solved problem, or an easy problem to solve. Whilst there are a number of proposals 
(Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2017), they need further research, 
development, and analysis. One thing is certain: open publication of de-identified data is not a 
secure solution for sensitive unit-record level data.  
Our motivation in this work is to highlight the challenges and demonstrate the surprising ease 
with which de-identification can fail. Conquering this challenge will require open and 
transparent discussion and research, in advance of any future releases.  This report concludes 
with some specific alternative suggestions, including the use of differential privacy for 
published data, and secure, controlled access to sensitive data for researchers. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Our findings replicate those of similar studies of other de-identified datasets: 
• A few mundane facts taken together often suffice to isolate an individual.  
• Some patients can be identified by name from publicly available information. 
• Decreasing the precision of the data, or perturbing it statistically, makes re-identification 
gradually harder at a substantial cost to utility. STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER 
We first examine uniqueness according to basic medical procedures such as childbirth.  We 
show that some individuals are unique given public information, and show also that many 
patients are unique given a few basic facts such as year of birth and dates of childbirth. 
Although the data is only a 10% sample, we can quantify the confidence of re-identifications, 
which can be high.  We use a second dataset of population-wide billing frequencies, which 
sometimes shows that the person is unique in the whole population.   
We then examine uniqueness according to the characteristics of commercial datasets we know 
of but do not have.  We find high uniqueness rates that would allow linking with a commercial 
pharmaceutical dataset.  We also explain that, consistent with the ``Unique in the shopping 
mall,” (de Montjoye, Radaelli, Singh, & Pentland, 2015) financial transactions in the dataset are 
sufficient for easy re-identification by the patient’s bank. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Although our specific example is the linked MBS/PBS 10% sample, our results also have 
implications for the secondary uses of other data such as My Health Records.  The de-
identification methods were bound to fail, because they were trying to achieve two 
inconsistent aims: protection of individual privacy and publication of detailed individual 
records.  We demonstrate why that is probably not possible for 30 years of medical billing data.  
We expect similar results to apply to other rich datasets in the government's care, including 
census data, tax records, mental health records, penal data and centrelink data. 
We support the program of making more data more easily available to facilitate research, 
innovation and sound public policy.  However, there is an important technical and procedural 
problem to solve: there is no good solution for publishing sensitive unit-record level data that 
protects privacy without substantially degrading the usefulness of the data.  Policy should be 
made with a clear understanding of the technical ease and serious consequences of re-
identification.   
This contributes to the debate over the relationship between re-identification, uniqueness and 
confidence.  While uniqueness does not imply re-identification, we show through specific 
examples that uniqueness, given particular data that is known to be held by certain parties, 
does imply the opportunity for re-identification.  Re-identification is made easier by combining 
multiple datasets, and can be established with very high confidence although the dataset is only 
a 10% sample.   THE RE-IDENTIFICATION AMENDMENT 
The Australian government announced plans to amend the Privacy Act to criminalise re-
identification of published government data, effective immediately, in September 2016 
(Brandis, 2016).  The proposed criminal offences would apply if “the information was published 
on the basis that it was de-identified personal information” 16(D) 1(b).  The bill has not (yet) 
passed, though half of the relevant Senate committee recommended that it should, despite 
noting, "concerns that have been expressed about aspects of this bill by submitters, including 
the introduction of criminal offences, the reversed burden of proof and the retrospective 
application of the bill." (Parliament of Australia, 2017).  
A dissenting report (by an equal number of Senators) stated, "the bill adopts a punitive 
approach towards information security researchers and research conducted in the public 
interest. In contrast, government agencies that publish poorly de-identified information do not 
face criminal offences and are not held responsible. … The bill discourages research conducted 
in the public interest as well as open discussion of issues which may have been identified."  We 
agree.   
They also argued that, "retrospective provisions offend a fundamental principle in the rule of 
law."  Again we agree.  At the time of the initial announcement, a spokesperson was quoted on 
the ABC saying that “Provisions will be included in the legislation to allow legitimate research to 
continue,” (Ockenden, 2016) which we interpreted to include all legitimate research.  However, 
when the written bill appeared in October, no such exemption was included, though 
government entities and others designated by the minister could be exempted. This could 
easily have put researchers in the difficult position of having conducted what they believed was 
a legal investigation, only to find that disclosing their findings amounted to admitting to having 
committed a crime.2 
Algorithms for protecting online security and privacy need careful scrutiny in order to be 
improved and strengthened.  The introduction of legislative amendments that, whether 
intentionally or not, have a chilling effect on both the research and wider discourse around this 
topic, risks critically hampering this effort. Whilst open data is not a safe approach for releasing 
this type of data, open government is the right paradigm for deciding what is. 
We hope this paper contributes to a fair, open, scientific and constructive discussion of these 
important issues. PAPER OUTLINE 
There are two ways to identify individuals in a de-identified dataset: decryption and linking.  
The first section of this report asks how hard it was to recognise and correct the weakness in 
the encryption of supplier IDs, which we notified the government about in September 2016.  
We then examine the difficulty of linking attacks, which involve combining other sources of 
information with the published dataset to re-identify individual patients. 
How hard is this re-identification? Unfortunately, it is straightforward for anyone with technical 
skills about the level of an undergraduate computing degree.  
The later sections examine the possibility of large-scale linking with commercial datasets, then 
the assessment of confidence of re-identifications. DECRYPTING SUPPLIER IDS 
When we read the description of the method of encrypting supplier IDs, it suggested to us the 
use of pseudorandom number generation, which was insecure in that setting.  We could then 
guess the algorithm, reverse it, and notify the government, who promptly removed the data 
                                                     
2 Especially researchers at the ANU or private labs.  State-based universities are apparently not 
covered by federal privacy law. 
from the website.  At the time we said that 
there was a risk that someone else would 
discover the same weakness. 
We learned later that the inappropriateness of 
that encryption scheme had been discussed 
extensively on Twitter weeks beforehand.   
(See weakly de-identified picture.)  So we 
were not the first to discover this problem - it 
was obvious to many other people. 
This specific issue is easy to correct, using any 
standard encryption algorithm such as RSA or 
AES.  Indeed, encryption was not necessary – a 
randomly chosen unique number for each 
person would have worked. INDIVIDUAL LINKAGE ATTACKS 
“Succinctly put, ‘De-identified’ data isn’t, and 
the culprit is auxiliary information.” 
--- Cynthia Dwork 
Computer scientists have used linkage attacks to re-identify de-identified data from various 
sources including telephone metadata (Srivatsa & Hicks, 2012), social network connections 
(Narayanan, Shi, & Rubinstein, 2011), health data (Sweeney, 2002) and online ratings 
(Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2008), and found high rates of uniqueness in mobility data (De 
Montjoye, 2013) and credit card transactions (de Montjoye, Radaelli, Singh, & Pentland, 2015).  
Linkage attacks work by identifying a “digital fingerprint” in the data, meaning a combination of 
features that uniquely identifies a person.  If two datasets have related records, one person’s 
digital fingerprint should be the same in both.  This allows linking of a person’s data from the 
two different datasets – if one dataset has names then the other dataset can be re-identified.  
This is not necessarily sophisticated: re-identification based on simply linking with online 
information has also been reported (Barbaro & Zeller Jr, 2010) (Duhigg, 2002). 
EXAM PLE:  THE  NE TFLI X M OVIE  R ATINGS  D ATASE T 
Netflix, a US DVD rental and streaming service, published a de-identified dataset of users’ 
movie ratings.  The IMDb movie knowledgebase website listed users’ names along with their 
ratings.  Many users rated a similar (or identical) list of movies on both sites.  Different people 
watch different movies: a person’s collection of movies served as a fingerprint, uniquely 
identifying many users.  Narayan and Shmatikov (2008) demonstrated that the Netflix dataset 
could be re-identified by matching it with IMDb movie ratings and the attached name.  One 
user re-identified in this way had rated sensitive movies privately on Netflix, but not on IMDb.  
The re-identification technique still worked even given perturbations in the data and some 
errors in the linking assumptions, because a person’s film choices are often very different from 
everyone else’s. 
We attempt to apply these techniques to the MBS/PBS dataset. 
BACK G RO UND  ON  THE MBS/PBS 10% S AM PLE D ATASE T 
The MBS/PBS dataset contains billing information, including PBS (prescription) and MBS 
(medical) records for 10% of Australians born in each year.  Each patient has an encrypted ID 
number and a year of birth and gender.  Each record attaches a medical event to a patient, 
including a code identifying the service or prescription, the state the supplier and patient were 
in, a date, the price paid by the patient and reimbursed by Medicare and, in the case of MBS 
records, an encrypted supplier ID.  Some rare events were removed before publication, and all 
the dates were perturbed randomly by up to two weeks in an effort to protect privacy.  Some 
MBS/PBS item codes are generic (code 00023 occurs millions of times, indicating a visit to the 
GP); others are highly specific and sensitive, such as prescriptions that are only for HIV patients 
or codes for “management of second-trimester labor”. 
How easy is it to identify individuals in the dataset by linking the unencrypted parts of the 
record with known information about the person?   
We start by investigating whether the sort of health, demographic, or movement data typically 
available in a person's public profile is sufficient to identify them uniquely if they are in the 
released dataset.  This is the minimum information that could be available to a malicious 
attacker. 
Many people include on their public profiles their year of birth and gender.  This typically puts 
them in a crowd of more than ten thousand in the MBS/PBS 10% sample.  When new 
information is added, however, the set of possible matches shrinks rapidly.  Each new item of 
known information reduces the set of possible matches within the dataset.  When the set of 
possible matches is small enough to inspect manually, the person’s privacy is seriously at risk, if 
that person is in the dataset. 
 
 
 
SE AR C HING  FO R  MYSE LF (V TE AG UE) 
There are nearly 3 million people in the dataset, but only 17,310 women share my year of birth. 
Two of my children were born in Australia, one in 2006 and the other in 2011. Specifying these 
years of birth gives 59 possible matches, 23 in my home state of Victoria. Knowing their exact 
birthdates, and incorporating the two-week perturbation of dates, leaves zero records.    
This shows that I am not in the dataset, but if I was I would be easily isolated based on no more 
information than a typical personal Wikipedia page.  This is consistent with other privacy 
analyses in the literature.  A person doesn’t need to have a single rare event in order to be 
identifiable - often a collection of ordinary facts suffices. 
Of course, re-identification can be mistaken, but these sorts of results give us some idea of how 
much information is necessary to identify a person with confidence.  If we found that, for about 
90% of people, two exact dates of childbirth returned zero matches, then we could infer a fairly 
low probability of mistaken re-identification based on that much information. 
SE AR C HING  FO R  O THE RS 
Information about childbirth patterns is both commonly shared and often unique. 
The table below counts births in the dataset from a (deliberately obscured) year b to b+4, for 
mothers born from year m to m+5.  These are women who gave birth quite late in life.  
Everyone in this age range is unique by years of maternal and child birth, without considering 
state and without requiring it to be her first child. No cell has more than one, even over the 12 
months. 
Year of birth 
(mother\baby) 
b b+1 b+2 b+3 b+4 
m 0 0 0 1 1 
m+1 0 0 13 
Dec b+2 or Jan b+3 
1 
Dec b+2 or Jan b+3 
0 
m+2 0 1 
July/Aug 
1 
July 
0 1 
m+3 1 0 0 0 0 
m+4 1 1 1 0 0 
FIGURE 2: NUMBERS OF CHILDBIRTHS BY OLDER MOTHERS, 5 YEAR RANGE. 
                                                     
3 There is only one childbirth for a mother born in m+1.  It is recorded on 2nd January, but because of the 2-week perturbation it 
might have been in December b+2 or January b+3. 
If an attacker knew any of these older mothers, and knew their year of birth and the year their 
child was born, they could be easily re-identified.  The opposite end of the maternal age range 
is similar: very few childbirths are recorded in which the mother is under 18. 
HOW  CO ULD  PRIV ACY  OF THESE RE CO RDS  BE  PRO TE C TED? 
The 2-week perturbation of dates makes no impact on data this sparse.  Increasing the 
perturbation to a few more weeks wouldn’t make the slightest difference – we would still have 
a very small number of women this age giving birth in any given year.  Similarly, reducing the 
precision of the year of mother’s birth (for example specifying a 5 year age range rather than 
the particular year) would still leave a very small number of births, which could be distinguished 
by state. 
The next obvious suggestion is to remove unusual individuals completely, or at least to remove 
unusual events such as giving birth very late or very early in life.  However, this is highly 
problematic.  A person’s “anonymity set” is the number of records consistent with all known 
facts about that person.  Mothers in the table above have an anonymity set of 1 if their year of 
birth and year of giving birth are known.  What size of anonymity set is acceptable?  For large 
states like NSW and Victoria, there are quite a few women giving birth in their late 40s.  Should 
we demand the same level of anonymity for smaller states such as SA/NT and WA?   How much 
extra information should be necessary to isolate a particular patient?  For example, information 
about at least one other child is likely to produce a unique match in this set.  Is that acceptable?  
These important questions do not seem to have good answers.  Removing these individuals or 
events would reduce the accuracy of the data and bias or even prevent some possible studies.  
Leaving them in is a serious risk to privacy, even with a large perturbation of dates.   
Removing unusual individuals is a false option anyway, because everyone is unusual given 
enough information about them.  Indeed, for childbirth as for many other facts about people, a 
small collection of ordinary events is usually enough to isolate that person.  In the next section 
we discuss identification based on knowledge of 2 or 3 dates of childbirth among women who 
are not particularly old or young. 
UNIQUE  CHILD BI R TH  PATTE RNS 
We examined the sample data to understand how much information about a woman’s 
childbirth history was needed to identify her.  An individual in the dataset matches someone 
else if they were born in the same year and if every time they have a child, the dates are within 
4 weeks.  (This is the furthest that two events truly on the same day could be shifted apart by 
the 14-day perturbation.)  We asked how much information was necessary to limit one person 
to a very small number of (other) matches.  The results are shown in the dark blue bars of 
Figure 3.  We have already seen that some very old or very young mothers are uniquely 
identifiable.  So are women who have unusually many children.  We found that 102,593 women 
in the dataset have at most 6 possible matches (including themselves).   More than 55,000 are 
unique. 4  
We then asked whether a larger perturbation of dates would improve privacy, and if so by how 
much.  The results are shown in the same figure, for 28 days (red), 60 days (yellow) and 90 days 
(green).  Like other similar studies, we found that larger perturbations improved privacy only a 
little.  Doubling the perturbation to 28 days still leaves 30,000 unique individuals.  Even with a 
90-day perturbation, more than 9,000 mothers are unique.  In the context of pregnancy and 
childbirth, a 3 month perturbation of dates would seriously affect the accuracy of many 
scientific studies.    
 
FIGURE 3: MATCHES BY CHILDBIRTH DATES  RE-I DENTI FI CA TION  B A SED  ON  P U B LIC CHI LD BI RTH  IN FO R MA TION 
We read Wikipedia pages and online news stories about famous Australians who are also 
mothers, recording their years of birth and the birthdates of their children if we could find 
them.   We5 then entered that information as queries in the database. The first few, including 
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This probably correlates highly with financial resources and hence is relatively easy to guess. 
5 All the sensitive database queries were conducted by V Teague 
Prof Gillian Triggs, former Senator Natasha Stott-Despoja, Olympic athlete Cathy Freeman and 
deputy opposition leader Tanya Plibersek, returned zero matches.  Hence we can be fairly 
confident that those people are not in the sample.6  This sounds comforting, but really isn't, 
because it suggests that if they were there they would probably be unique and therefore easily 
identifiable. 
Of 18 queries involving 2 or more childbirth-related events, 13 had no matches in the dataset.    
One match was rejected as inconsistent with other information about the target person; 
another was omitted when the online information was found to be inconsistent. 
Three queries returned unique matches.  OT HER  H EA LT H-R ELAT ED PU B LI C FI NG ERPRI N TS 
Many other health-related characteristics could be enough to identify a person.  Many other 
types of people make a great deal of information about their health available on the Internet.  
We conducted a brief study of professional footballers, noting their injuries and surgeries over 
the years from online information and translating them into database queries.  The results were 
very similar to those for childbirths.  Some people’s distinctive histories are clearly absent.  For 
one AFL team captain, a unique record matches the publicly available information about his 
medical history, year of birth, and interstate movements.   
Sometimes a news story gives very precise dates for someone’s surgery or hospital admission.  
In two instances a news story about a relatively common operation on a (former or current) 
member of a state parliament matches a unique record.   
Overall, including the re-identifications from childbirths, sports injuries and single surgeries, we 
devised 43 queries and found 7 unique matches.  This is about 17%, which is consistent with a 
10% sample, some randomness, and some probability of a mistaken re-identification based on a 
coincidental resemblance.  We discuss the confidence of these re-identifications below. LARGE-SCALE LINKAGE WITH OTHER DATASETS 
So far we have used linking information from one-off sources.  However, some entities have 
access to large databases, with names, that could be a source of linking information for many 
people at once. 
                                                     
6 Many childbirths occur in a public hospital setting that is never billed to medicare and therefore not in the 
dataset.  Hence it is possible that some of those people are in the dataset but their childbirths are not. 
Australian privacy law refers to what can “reasonably” be re-identified, but this depends on 
what other data is available for linking.  Latanya Sweeney purchased the electoral roll database 
of Cambridge (USA) and used it to re-identify the state governor’s medical record (Sweeney, 
2002).  The Australian electoral roll is not available for purchase, but is widely distributed.  
What other datasets is it reasonable to assume an attacker might be able to access?   
BILLING  D ATA AND HE AL TH  INS URE RS 
One example is the billing data itself: the fees associated with MBS records.  Private health 
insurers have access to much of their own customers' Medicare claim information.  A simple 
way to compute the links is to add up the numbers and compare the totals.   
The MBS/PBS dataset lists, for each transaction, the amount paid by the patient (or private 
insurer) and the amount paid by the government.  We computed, for each patient and each 
year, the government’s total payments and the patient’s total payments, for MBS and PBS 
separately, for all the transactions in that year.  This produces four numbers each year, which 
constitute a fingerprint.  Of the 2.1 million patients with records in 2014, nearly 900,000 
received a unique total of paid MBS benefits, while over 900,000 paid a unique contribution.  As 
we add more years, almost everyone is unique.   
Most health insurance companies would be missing some of this data, for example if the item is 
bulk billed or paid by the patient.  The same approach would work on whatever data they did 
have.  If the rates of uniqueness were a little smaller on the restricted dataset, totals for 
different years of data could be used together. 
This demonstrates that a private health insurer (for example) could efficiently track the medical 
records of past customers through the decades of data, or derive extra information they didn’t 
know about from current customers. This would be a clear breach of privacy that would 
possibly never be reported, even though the data could lead to detrimental decisions for the 
individual in the future. 
The proposed amendments to the Privacy Act criminalizing re-identification would not stop 
this. Rather than explicitly re-identifying the government dataset, the health insurance 
company could link it to a de-identified version of their own database, derive some conclusions, 
delete the MBS/PBS data, and then link their conclusions back to their named clients using the 
intersecting data.  
 
 
PH ARM ACY  REC OR DS AND D ATA BR OKE RS 
In 2017 the Melbourne hackathon used a de-identified commercial dataset of pharmaceutical 
records.  Although the dataset is not openly available, a metadata file shows that it included 
unit-record-level longitudinal patient data, and that dates were aggregated into months.   
Records could be linked by finding uniqueness in the pharmaceutical part of the government’s 
10% sample.  A few prescriptions suffice.  For example in 2003, even without dates, 29,603 
people who have two prescriptions are unique in the PBS 10% sample.  Figure 4 shows the 
number of patients with some set of 3 unique prescriptions, for each total number of 
prescriptions.  Overall 147,717 (about 16%) have at least one set of three unique prescriptions 
in 2003.   
 
FIGURE 4: NUMBER OF PATIENTS WITH SOME SET OF 3 UNIQUE PRESCRIPTIONS, PER TOTAL NUMBER OF PRESCRIPTIONS. 
 
The extra information in the commercial dataset could be used to increase confidence in 
matches.  Suppose a patient was unique according to 3 matching prescriptions in both datasets.  
If the date ranges also happened to be consistent, then this would greatly increase the 
confidence of correct re-identification.  The confidence is hard to quantify, but if the dates were 
chosen completely randomly (the best possible case) then a coincidental match would happen 
with probability about (1/6)3.  
The commercial dataset includes postal code (ZIP code) for both pharmacy and patient.  Thus, 
an accurate link would allow the reattachment of precise location information to the 
longitudinal 10% sample, which in turn would greatly increase the rates of uniqueness and the 
confidence of accurate re-identifications. 
PAYMEN T D ATA AND  BANKS  O R  CRE DI T C ARD  C OM PANIES 
Credit card records alone can be used to identify an individual.  A recent paper on the 
uniqueness of credit card billing data (de Montjoye, Radaelli, Singh, & Pentland, 2015) found 
that only 4 transactions were needed to make 90% of people unique, even when prices were 
removed.  Perturbing dates by 15 days improved privacy a little, but 80% of people were still 
unique based on 10 transactions.  The exact numbers might not translate across to the 
Australian setting, but the implication would: if someone paid for even a handful of doctor’s 
visits or PBS prescriptions with their credit card, then their bank or credit card company would 
probably have enough information to re-identify their MBS/PBS record. 
LINKING  WI TH  O THER  GOV ERN MEN T D ATAS E TS 
The more individual records the government puts online, the more data can be used in a 
linkage attack.  For example, raw census data includes dates of birth for the entire household.7  
We are not aware of any public ABS microdata that reports this information, but if there was 
one it could be linked with dates of childbirth in the MBS/PBS dataset. Based on our analysis 
above, this would provide a unique fingerprint for many women and hence many households.  
Again some perturbation of dates would make this a little harder, but any reasonable 
perturbation would still allow some rate of successful linkages.  The guarantee that “no 
personally identifiable data will be released from the census” could therefore depend on what 
other data is already published and how easily it can be re-identified and linked to census data. 
MALI CIO US  ATTACKE R S 
The information available to well-intentioned researchers represents the absolute minimum 
information available to someone with criminal intent.  The same approach could be used to 
link information extracted by social engineering, derived from social media by deception, or 
purchased from leaked or illegally exfiltrated datsets of personal information such as the recent 
Red Cross leak, which included names and addresses as well as some medical information.   
Discoveries about data are often more powerful in combination than alone.  The decryption of 
supplier IDs might not immediately reveal very much about patients, but it could be combined 
with other data to make a linkage attack much easier.  Even without decryption, re-
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identification of one individual could make others easier, for example if one elite athlete’s 
record reveals which surgeon treats other elite athletes.  
The threat model here is very strong: a dataset released today might still be scrutinized in the 
presence of extra information decades into the future.  SAMPLING, UNIQUENESS AND CONFIDENCE 
Several letters in recent issues of Science have been devoted to an argument over the meaning 
of uniqueness results in a sample (Sanchez, Martinez, & Domingo-Ferrer, 2016).  One side of 
the argument emphasizes that  
• uniqueness within the sample does not necessarily imply uniqueness within the whole 
population: a unique match might actually be a coincidental resemblance to someone who 
is not in the sample, so re-identification cannot be made with confidence, and 
• uniqueness does not imply successful re-identification, if you don’t know enough points 
about someone to make them unique. 
Although these are both true, they are not as comforting as they sound. 
• If the attacker knows the facts that make a person unique, and that person is in the sample, 
then uniqueness does imply re-identification.  If those facts are easily available on the 
Internet, then uniqueness implies easy re-identification. 
• There might be other ways to learn that a particular fingerprint is unique in the whole 
population.  If that fingerprint appears in the sample, then the match is right. 
• There might be more information available about a person than is required to make them 
unique.  For example, if 3 facts produce a unique match, and another 2 known facts also 
match the retrieved record, this would increase confidence. 
• Matches of infrequent types could be made with more confidence than matches of more 
common types.  The frequency of occurrences of particular profiles in the sample could be 
used to estimate the frequency in the whole population.  
• Confidence may not be necessary anyway.  The identification is accurate if the person is in 
the dataset. 
EXAM PLE:  PO PULATI O N UNIQ UENESS  BASED  ON DHS S TATIS TICS  
The department of human services releases statistics about the rates of MBS billing codes, for 
the whole population (not just 10%).8  These are aggregated into patient age ranges of ten 
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years, and reported for each state and each month.  Some codes are very uncommon, and are 
either absent or billed only once in particular months for particular ranges of patient age.  
Overall, 27% are unique. 
For example, former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd had an unusual surgery (an aortic valve 
replacement) in Brisbane in August 2011.  According to the DHS data, this surgery was unique in 
that month and age range.  His record is not in the longitudinal 10% sample dataset, but if it 
was this could form evidence of a correct re-identification.9 
This sort of data can also be used to reduce confidence in false identifications.  For example, 
Senator Cory Bernardi was diagnosed with tuberculosis in February or March of 1996.  The rate 
of this disease in Australia is so low that, when we found a man of the right age in the 
longitudinal 10% sample dataset who had had this test, we were fairly confident that the match 
was right.  However, a careful examination of the DHS data shows that, although in most age 
ranges and months there are zero or one tuberculosis tests in South Australia, in those 
particular dates and age ranges there are 4.10  This turned out to be a false match, and that fact 
was made more obvious by population-level uniqueness data. 
EXAM PLE:  ES TIM ATES  OF CONFID ENCE  F OR  R E-IDENTIFI C ATIONS   
Our re-identification results are a concrete example.   
Three of our re-identifications are based on multiple childbirth-related events per person.  For 
these, the DHS data does not help estimate confidence. 
The other four re-identifications are based upon a single date of surgery, which is unique in the 
10% sample within the two-week perturbation, given gender, year of birth and state.  We now 
examine the probability of an incorrect match. 
One newspaper article describes a particular (named) patient as the oldest person to have had 
that surgery in the state.  There are two possible item codes, one for the simple version and 
one for the complex version of this surgery.  The DHS data lists one of each in the 10-year age 
range for the right month.  The 10% sample has one consistent with the story, with the 
                                                     
9 This is complicated by the two-week perturbation.  Although there were no other patients in 
August or September, there was one in July whose dates could have been perturbed to form a 
false positive.  There would need to be some evidence against this possibility, e.g. if that person 
was also in the dataset.  If not, there would be a 50% chance of accurate re-identification 
without other information. 
10 This may not be a coincidence: tuberculosis is highly infectious and when one person tests 
positive their friends are often tested too.  Perhaps the 3 other South Australian men of the 
same age were friends of Sen Bernardi. 
"complex" code.  It happens to be listed on the 16th of the month, which could not have 
originated in a different month.  If we assume that the oldest person earns the "complex" code 
then this is conclusive evidence of correct re-identification.  If the alternative (simply-coded) 
person is born in a different year then the re-identification must be right. Without either 
assumption, there is a 50% probability that it is a false match with the alternative person.  
Three more re-identifications are by uniqueness based on age, gender, state and dates of 
surgery.  In each case, the DHS data suggest a small total population within the right ten-year 
age range, but not small enough to be confident of population-wide uniqueness.    
In the first case, the surgery occurred in May.  DHS data prove this was the only case for that 
age, gender, state and month.  One record in the 10% sample is consistent – it has a date of 
May 10.  However, the DHS data also lists two of the same surgeries in April, so it is possible 
that a false match occurred if one of those was perturbed to the 10th of May.  At most, the 
probability of a mistaken re-identification is 2/3.   
It is tempting to assume that the other two occurrences are randomly chosen among the ten-
year age range and over days in April.  This would produce a very much lower estimate of the 
probability of a mistaken re-identification.  However, this reasoning is not valid: the two 
alternatives may for various reasons be the same age as our target, or have had surgery at the 
end of April.  (Recall the example of tuberculosis testing above.)   
Analysis for the other two re-identifications yields probabilities of at most 9/10 and 4/5 for a 
mistaken re-identification.  Again a random model of age and date distributions would produce 
a much lower probability.     
There are 91,522 items in the DHS dataset that are unique by month, state and age range and 
have no matching item in either the prior or following month.  Of these, 4919 have a consistent 
record in the 10% sample with a year of birth guaranteed to put the patient into the right age 
range.  If an attacker knew those patients, this would be evidence of 100% confident re-
identification.11 
More precise dates can be inferred for records linked across the two datasets.  If a record is 
linked, the possible dates for the service are the intersection of those for each dataset alone.  
For example, an event listed in the DHS data in April but perturbed to May 14 in the 10% 
sample must have occurred on April 30. 
If we had analyzed uniqueness and attempted re-identification over the whole population 
rather than a 10% sample, we would have a list of perhaps 30 or 40 very confident re-
                                                     
11 Unexpectedly, 64 have 2 or 3 matches.  We suspect this reflects accidental omissions from the DHS data.   
identifications.  Instead we have a list of seven, of which 3 or 4 are likely to be right.  For the 
90% of people who are not in the sample, this is a huge gain.  For the 10% who are, the 
incomplete confidence has little benefit. DISCUSSION: WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
Taking advantage of the benefits of big data without seriously compromising privacy is one of 
the most difficult engineering challenges of our time.  It makes no sense for the government to 
insist on one solution to this problem – the open publication of de-identified data – despite 
conclusive evidence that this solution does not work. 
The MBS/PBS 10% sample dataset release was motivated by convincing arguments about the 
utility of that data for medical research that saves lives.  We strongly support this sort of 
research, and the general aim of informing public policy and inspiring innovation with scientific 
analysis of data.  The question is how to engineer that without destroying privacy. 
Our re-identification of some people in the MBS/PBS 10% sample dataset is not an isolated 
case, but a replication of numerous other results in which similar techniques have been shown 
to work on other datasets.  Re-identification will only become easier as more information is 
released.  The combination of attributes that could form fingerprints is difficult to predict and 
safeguard against, which is why privacy criteria like k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) are inherently 
flawed (Machanavajjhala, Kifer, Gehrke, & Venkitasubramaniam, 2007) (Li, Li, & 
Venkatasubramanian, 2007).  It is very unlikely that even the most well-informed and well-
intentioned set of guidelines on de-identification can guarantee privacy protections appropriate 
for sensitive data such as the MBS/PBS 10% sample while retaining the usefulness of the data. 
A well-intentioned official might carefully follow a de-identification process, but some 
individuals might still be “reasonably identifiable”.  If compliance with de-identification 
guidelines is wrongly assumed to imply proper mathematical protections of privacy, this 
represents a serious loophole in privacy law, not just for government but also for private 
companies. 
Of course it is possible to remove information from records until nothing meaningful can be 
derived about individual people.  The question is whether this approach solves any of the 
problems that open data is intended to solve, or whether the manipulation necessary to 
protect privacy destroys the research value of the data.  If scientists still need to apply for the 
unperturbed or unaggregated version, then we haven’t really solved the problem of data 
access. 
 
SOME  S PE CIFI C Q UES TI ONS AND  S UGGES TIO NS 
There are many alternatives to full open release of de-identified data.  It is better to specify a 
good process for encouraging research and fact-based decisions about privacy protection and 
data sharing, than to commit in advance to one particular solution that probably doesn’t work. 
Different solutions might solve different problems.  It is important to ask exactly what problem 
are we trying to solve? 
Open public release of data about government is a great idea.  Public transport data, 
expenditure, and other non-sensitive data should be publicly released. 
Data about people should be much more carefully considered.  It is important to ask why the 
data is being released, who needs to see it, what they are allowed to do with it, and what the 
implications of a breach would be.  Here is a short list of possible solutions.  All of them still 
include some risk of information leakage, and some inconvenience to researchers.  Different 
approaches address different problems and have different risks - evaluating the tradeoffs would 
require input from the scientists who use this data.   
• Basic de-identification, such as removing names, could be combined with other methods of 
securing the data. 
• Access to data could be controlled either physically or electronically.  Researchers could sign 
up and have their access controlled by a license with penalties for misuse or leakage.   
• The Australian Productivity Commission’s draft report on Data Availability and Use 
recommended giving de-identified data to “trusted users.”  These could be required to meet 
standards for data security. 
• Researchers could apply for only those parts of a dataset that they actually need to do their 
particular research. 
• Narayan and Shmatikov (2010) suggest “An interactive, query-based approach is generally 
superior from the privacy perspective to the 'release-and-forget' approach.”  
• Aggregate data rather than individual records could be released publicly.  Frameworks such 
as Differential Privacy (Dwork, 2008) could be used to assess what aggregates are privacy-
preserving. 
• In some cases cryptography can be used to make inferences from hidden information, for 
example to compute totals without decrypting individual records, or to link records from 
different datasets without decrypting individual IDs.  However, this doesn’t guarantee that 
the results of the linking or tallying will protect privacy. 
• Expressive consent models such as Dynamic Consent (Kaye, 2015) could allow patients much 
greater control and visibility over their data. 
• Portals such as data.gov.au could list all the available datasets, including sets not published 
openly on the website.  This could include instructions and requirements for access to data 
that was available under stricter conditions. 
Australia can learn from overseas examinations of the same issues.  The European Union 
recently released guidelines for the release of public datasets 
(https://www.europeandataportal.eu/en/content/how-address-privacy-concerns-when-
opening-data).  Step 1 is “Understand the data. Consider potential use cases, the value of the 
data and potential risks.”  A de-identification algorithm might be suitable for a scientist working 
under a legal responsibility to keep the data private, but not suitable for public release of the 
dataset.  
A US presidential commission on cybersecurity received a number of submissions on privacy 
and data sharing.  An MIT submission (Pentland, Shrier, Hardjono, & Wladawsky-Berger, 2016) 
emphasised “Open Algorithms” and “Permissible Use.”  Open algorithms means that details 
about the methods and processes should be available for public scrutiny; permissible use 
emphasises the consent or expectations of the people whose data is shared. 
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy recently released a draft report 
on privacy, big data and open data: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/A-72-
43103_EN.docx 
Privacy protection is a subfield of computer science with a peer-reviewed literature that can 
underpin good decisions about sensitive data.  Privacy should be designed into these processes 
by people who understand this science.   
Publishing details about the de-identification techniques for the MBS/PBS data was the right 
thing to do because it allowed the problems to be detected.  This approach should be retained 
and extended: before data is released, details about the process should be published so that 
they can be examined by privacy experts and the public.  Then the government can make good 
decisions based on full information from free and open research and public comment. CONCLUSION 
Recent government policy relies on secure de-identification of detailed personal data, but 
secure de-identification of rich data is probably not possible without substantially degrading the 
data (Ohm, 2010).  This report shows that some MBS/PBS records can be re-identified, thus 
adding another example to a long list of unsuccessful attempts at de-identification of sensitive 
datasets.   
These failures are not simply a result of choosing a bad method of de-identification.  They 
reflect the inherent statistical fact that a small number of ordinary points of information is 
often enough to identify a person.  Perturbing the data or decreasing its precision can improve 
privacy gradually, at considerable cost to accuracy.  Removing rare individuals or rare events is 
a false hope because everyone is unique if enough information about them is known.   
The proposed amendment to the Privacy Act to criminalise re-identification will not solve these 
problems.  It will make them harder to detect, understand and avoid.   It inhibits open public 
analysis and discussion, and hence makes personal data less secure. 
There are exciting new ideas for provably privacy-preserving computation on sensitive data, 
including Differential Privacy, homomorphic encryption and multiparty computation.  These 
ideas are being put into practice in Australia and overseas. 
The Australian government holds vast quantities of information about individual Australians.  It 
is not really “government data”.   It is data about people, entrusted to the government’s care. 
Data about government should be published openly and freely - not so for sensitive data about 
people. That should be published only when a clear, public explanation of the encryption and 
anonymization methods has received enough peer review and public scrutiny to convince 
everyone that personal information will remain private.  For some datasets, including the 
MBS/PBS unit-record level data, this is probably not possible. 
Making more data available more widely could have many benefits, but the approach needs to 
be re-engineered with a better understanding of the risks.  Australia really can become a leader 
in the data sciences by encouraging free and open research in privacy-preserving technologies 
for data sharing.  Understanding which ideas don’t work is a first step in innovation towards 
techniques that do. 
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